

YOUTH MARGINALIZATION AND SECURITY IN MANDERA TRIANGLE, KENYA

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ABSTRACT

Marginalization is as a process by which a group or individual is denied access to important positions and symbols of economic, religious, or political power within any society a marginal group may actually constitute a numerical majority and should perhaps be distinguished from a minority group, which may be small in numbers, but has access to political or economic power. Youth radicalization in Mandera triangle, courtesy of marginalization has led to insecurity resulting in loss of lives, destruction of property and non-local workers seeking for transfer to other parts of the country. In the African context, socio-economic issues are key in radicalization processes. There is scanty literature on the correlation between marginalization and security in a developing country. The study investigated effect of marginalization on security situation in Mandera triangle. Data was obtained from all the six sub-counties, Mandera South, Mandera East, Mandera North, Banisa, Mandera West and Lafey. Descriptive survey design was used in the study. Snowball sampling technique was used to identify 100 respondents from a target population of 200 youth. The sample size was distributed proportionately among the six sub-counties. Three key informants were purposively selected from institutions. A structured questionnaire was used to collect data. Descriptive and inferential statistics was used to analysis data. Statistical package for social sciences (SPSS Version 22) was used in the analysis of data. The study concludes that marginalization ($\beta = -0.400$, $P < 0.05$) had positive significant effect on security in Mandera triangle. The study concluded that marginalization negatively affects security. From the conclusion, the study recommended that to address insecurity in Mandera, marginalization of the youth should be addressed at managerial and policy levels. The findings may inform the security sector in formulation of policies and laws in reducing marginalization and improving the security situation in Mandera Triangle

Keywords: Marginalization, Radicalization, Security, Insecurity, Mandera Triangle, Kenya

INTRODUCTION

Marginalization of the youth has been widely linked to numerous social-economic challenges facing many countries. There is some theoretical rationalization to suspect that a fundamental link exists between marginalized economic discrimination and domestic terrorist activity within countries. Bururia (2017) defines marginalization as a process by which a group or individual is denied access to important positions and symbols of economic, religious, or political power within any society a marginal group constitute a numerical majority and should perhaps be distinguished from a minority group, which may be small in numbers, but has access to political or economic power. Africa in particular has a host of terrorist organizations that include Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab, Wahabiya Salafist Sect in Ethiopia, the Boko Haram in northern Nigeria and the Lord's Resistance Army, which continues to pose an increasing threat to sub-regional peace and security (Cronin 2003). In the African context, socio-economic issues are key to radicalization processes. Radicalization is the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change. Indeed, the nexus between literacy, numeracy and the growth of radicalization has been observed in many areas across sub-Saharan Africa, including in the Sahel, North-east

Nigeria, North Cameroon, North-East Kenya and Somalia. The weak capacity of the State, combined with high levels of corruption, unaccountable public administration, weak or ineffective judicial systems and security services perceived as serving the political interests of elites rather than protecting the rights of citizens are all actively fueling the rapid growth of radicalization across Africa (UNDP, 2012).

According to Cronin (2003), the sub-region of East Africa accommodates diaspora radicalization; and is characterized by fragile states and ungoverned spaces; in addition to being anchored in the underlying axiom of Islamism. Somalia provides a safe place, training camps and opportunities for extremists to fight the 'enemies of Islam', Al-Shabaab have executed attacks in the region by relying on local assistance and support. Al-Shabaab has also managed to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and Tanzanian nationals to its ranks in Somalia. However, some of these activities of recruitment and extremism are linked to the proliferation of radicalism in the region (Biegon, 2000). The radicalization of youths and their recruitment for violent and illegal activities is not new to Kenya (Hellsten, 2016). Kenya is a hot bed for radicalization as well as being home to multiple and complex domestic criminal groups besides the area also being characterized by a youth bulge. In Kenya,

recruitment of individuals into radicalization is concentrated on the Kenya-Somali border and in Eastleigh estate in Nairobi which is predominantly inhabited by people of ethnic Somalis. Mandera Triangle has always been a political unit in a persistent struggle against a perceived marginalization. The youth have not been shy to coalesce in various religious-political groupings in search of recognition (Ali, 2008).

As long as citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalization will increase. In addition to being the victims of Al-Shabaab attacks, nationals from Kenya and Uganda are directly involved in recruiting fellow nationals to join the organization's ranks. Initially, after being radicalized, these individuals leave their countries to fight in Somalia. This trend has gradually changed in that, locally marginalized, radicalized and recruited individuals started being used to execute attacks in their own country (Botha, 2014). The perceived political and socio-economic deprivation and religious inclination serve to create an environment for nurturing radicalization and pro-terrorism attitudes among Kenyan Muslims. There have been notable measures to curb such factors particularly pinning down sources of funding and banning collaborating organizations in the country (Arts and Justus, 2010).

Social scientists, law enforcement organizations, and intelligence agencies all agree that terrorists are the product of a dynamic process called radicalization. Radicalization is the process of adopting for oneself or inculcating in others a commitment not only to a system of [radical] beliefs but also to their imposition on the rest of society. It is the compulsion to use violence to impose ones beliefs on the rest of society or to punish others for their "evil" actions or beliefs (Jenkins, 2009). This study was done in Mandera triangle, bordering Ethiopia to the North and Somalia to the East, from 2013-2018 when a myriad of security challenges including attacks, ambushes, killings and maiming of persons occurred. The study investigated effect of marginalization on security in Mandera County, Kenya.

Statement of the Problem

From 2009, Kenya's northern border was subject to numerous attacks which spread to other parts of the country, especially in the Mandera triangle. Nearly all of these have been blamed on al-Shabaab based in Somalia. The attacks caused the tragic loss of over 600 lives, destruction of property and a 20% reduction in tourist arrivals to Kenya in 2015 due to travel advisories in their countries. In 2015, earnings from the tourism sector were reported at KES 84.6 billion down

from KES 97 billion in 2014. This is the heavy security issue that Kenya has to deal with.

Marginalization and its twin sister radicalization of youths and their recruitment for violent and illegal activities is an emerging security concern in Kenya. Criminal gangs, ethnic sects and local militias have been active in Kenya. Youth radicalization in Mandera triangle has led to insecurity resulting in loss of lives, destruction property (including, Houses, killing of livestock, water resources, communication infrastructures) and non-local workers seeking for transfers to other parts of the country. The study therefore, sought to investigate causes of and effects of youth radicalization in Mandera triangle.

Objective of the Study

The objective of the study was to investigate effect of marginalization on security in Mandera Triangle.

Hypothesis

The study tested the hypothesis that marginalization has no statistically significant effect on security in Mandera Triangle, Kenya

Theoretical Framework

In understanding the causes that motivates individuals into radicalization, it is important first to understand relative deprivation as a theory of political violence. Gurr (2014) explains that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. This theory also applies to individuals who find their own welfare to be inferior to that of others to whom they compare themselves.

Gurr (2014) argues that relative deprivation is a term used to denote the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the "ought" and the "is" of collective value satisfaction. The concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece. Aristotle articulated the idea that revolution is driven by a relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure. For Aristotle, the principal cause of revolution is the aspiration for economic or political equality on the part of the common people who lack it, and the aspiration, Gurr states that perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is what leads to discontent, not the millionaire's absolute economic standing. Gurr (2014) explains that primary source of the human capacity for violence appears to be frustration-aggression mechanism. The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that disposes men to aggression, irrespective of its instrumentalities."

However, Gurr was not the first in his field to propose a link between frustration and aggression. Dollard (2011) and others were the first to propose the theory, postulating that frustration leads men to act aggressively. Accordingly, frustration is caused by relative deprivation, and the resulting aggression is manifested as radicalization. Quantitative studies of radicalization have increased dramatically in the past decade. Many articles in this body of literature sought to explain radicalization as the result of poor economic development and lack of education in a country. However, it soon became clear that this is not the case. Krueger and Malecková argue that eradication of poverty and universal secondary education are unlikely to change these feelings. Indeed, those who are well-off and well-educated may even perceive such feelings more acutely. In fact, terrorists tend to be better-educated and wealthier individuals than average. Angus (2016) noted that the emerging picture is that terrorists are men and women in their twenties with some post-secondary training, mostly in technical or engineering education. Biographies of Al-Qaeda members recorded by Spalek (2007) reveal that they are generally highly educated, mostly in scientific or technical disciplines. More recent studies of radicalization have focused on individual determinants rather than any interaction effect of economic and social variables.

Dollard (2015) examines whether economic globalization increases or decreases transnational terrorist incidents inside countries. Globalization may be tied closely to relative deprivation, in the sense that greater access to information about people in other countries increases awareness of one's relative world view. Dollard (2015) hypothesize that increased globalization leads to greater levels of international radicalization because trade makes it easier for terrorists to mobilize and move materials eventually used to carry out attacks across borders. Dollard (2015) finding on the connection between education, poverty, and radicalization confirm the assumption that terrorists tend to be well educated and from wealthy backgrounds. It is in this respect that youth who feel marginalized are prone to being recruited to radical groups and pose serious security threats to a country.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Bururia (2017) defines marginalization as a process by which a group or individual is denied access to important positions and symbols of economic, religious, or political power within any society a marginal group may actually constitute a numerical majority and should perhaps be distinguished from a minority group, which may be small in numbers, but has access to political or economic power. This study

suggests that there is a relationship between socioeconomic features of countries and the occurrence radicalism of the youth. Though the experience of minority group injustice has been identified as a factor that arouses and fuels youth radicalism campaigns in numerous qualitative studies of individual countries or individual terrorist movements, it has largely been overlooked in the growing cross-national, time-queries quantitative literature investigating the root causes of youth radicalism (Amin, 2011). Apart from control outcomes in studies focused on democratic rule, political stability, and national demographic composition as prognosticators of youth radicalism (Amin, 2011), a cross national empirical investigation of minority economic status as a cause of youth radicalism has not been analytically undertaken.

This is unusual, given the excess study of cross-national empirical factors on the causes of youth radicalism since 2001 and the importance afforded to the individual experience of ethnic, racial or class discrimination as a predictor of aggressive behavior and future violent crime within the sociology, social psychology, and criminology literatures (Bururia, 2017). There is some theoretical rationalization to suspect that a fundamental link exists between marginalized economic discrimination and domestic terrorist activity within countries and qualitative case studies of Northern Ireland and Latin America and research in Western Europe recognize marginalized group experience of discrimination as a cause for minority community radicalization that is misused by extremist movements and terrorist organizations (Bururia, 2017). It is worth noting that most of the studies have been qualitative in nature and the settings have been in developed countries. This is the gap that this study delved into.

The correlation between marginalization and youth radicalism can also work the opposite way. Countries with minority groups that do not face dynamic economic discrimination, or where the issues of the minority discrimination are addressed through favorable policies that equalize the differences between minority and majority populations, validate that they can effectively assimilate minorities into mainstream life. Minority communities in non-discriminatory societies are unlikely to be radicalized or to be estranged from mainstream cultures, hence making the terrorist group mission less prevalent and no 18 terrorist group recruitments taking place. In the qualitative study of counter-youth radicalism responses in Northern Ireland, the Spanish Basque region, Italy against the Red Brigades, Uruguay against the Tupamaros, and Cyprus against EOKA. Scanty literature on the relationship between youth

radicalization and security in Mandera is noted in literature reviewed.

Botha (2014) recognizes the poor economic status of certain groups within the population, in its place of the overall economic climate, as a significant element in stimulating terrorist group enrollment and activities. In analyzing the effectiveness of counter-youth radicalism tools, Hewitt acknowledges that active economic affirmative action for marginalized groups, for example education, health and housing subsidies in Northern Ireland, may reduce the threat of youth radicalism. Minority communities that are not distressed are likely to cooperate with state counter-youth radicalism officials. The literature on qualitative counter-insurgency recognizes that nurturing a sense of conventional system legality in the face of insurgent efforts is significant in securing community cooperation with security efforts (Botha, 2014).

Amin (2011) view was that minority experience of economic discrimination might trigger domestic youth radicalism. If economic discrimination against minorities precipitates domestic youth radicalism by heightening group infringements and motivating organization, then public policies crafted to enhance the effects of minority economic discrimination should decrease domestic youth radicalism (Botha (2014).

The paths toward radicalization among Muslim communities in East Africa vary, but some common themes emerge. Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab both successfully use the 'victimization narrative' to recruit and elicit support, manipulating perceptions of societal discrimination in countries like Kenya, where many Muslims express a sense of social, cultural, political, and economic exclusion from the rest of the country. Kenya's Muslim population is concentrated largely in Coast and Northeastern Provinces, and in certain Nairobi neighborhoods like Eastleigh. Social service delivery and infrastructure investments have been historically poor in these areas, in comparison with other parts of the country. Middle East-based Islamic charities reportedly provided important social services, including education and healthcare, before the government closed some of them as part of its response to the 1998 embassy bombings and the September 2001 World Trade Center attacks. Boredom, idleness, and thrill-seeking impulses may push extremism, and, when combined with feelings of marginalization and frustrated expectations stemming from a lack of job opportunities in many East African countries, make Muslim youth more susceptible to recruitment by groups like Al Shabaab. As one anthropologist argues, "today's most violent youth radicalism is rooted in rootlessness and restlessness" (Botha, 2014).

Muslims make up an estimated 11% of Kenya's population; large Muslim communities can be found in the country's northeast and in the coastal region. Traditionally, Kenya's Muslims are moderate, with the community peacefully seeking participation in politics. But ISS pointed to the historical political marginalization of Muslims - right from negotiations for Kenya's independence, in which ethnic Somalis, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, were not represented - as a contributor to the radicalization of young people (Munir, 2014). The report also found that some young Kenyan Muslims have been influenced by radical preaching, which leads them to believe that wars being fought against Muslims abroad - for example, in Afghanistan and Iraq - are part of "a global campaign against Islam. According to a 2011 report by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, non-Somali Kenyan nationals constituted the largest and most organized non-Somali group within Al-Shabab.

METHODOLOGY

The philosophical underpinning for the study was pragmatism whose aim is to determine practical solutions to problems and actual meanings of the results using what works best and use it to understand the research problem. This paradigm is always concerned with the implication of items and aims at the outcome of the research (Churchill, 2013). A descriptive survey design was used to give a detailed description of the determinants of youth radicalization and security in Mandera Triangle. The target population consisted of youths who had been recruited to join radical groups and have returned (returnees). Hence the target population was 200 returnees. Also 15 key informants were used as the target population. The target population was obtained from six sub-counties namely, Mandera South, Mandera East, Lafey, Mandera North, Mandera West and Banisa because they were susceptible to security issues.

The sample size included respondents (returnees) who had reformed. Using the target population of 200 returnees as a sampling frame, a sample of 100 respondents (50% of the target population) was taken. Purposive sampling targeted respondents (returnees) who were radicalized and had voluntarily reformed and returned to the society. Snow-balling sampling technique was used to locate and identify the respondents (returnees and the key informants). The selected sample size were distributed proportionately among the six sub-counties of Mandera East, Mandera South, Mandera West, Banisa, Mandera North and Lafey. Face validity was tested by my supervisors who scrutinized the questionnaire and discussed the questions to ensure a high degree of face validity in

relation to the expected structure of a questionnaire. To ensure content validity, the researcher will conducted a pilot study to test if the questions formulated were measuring the set objective (Hayes, 2012). Alpha Coefficient was used to test on the reliability which is usually used to measure internal consistency. A reliability coefficient of above 0.7 indicated that the instruments are reliable enough to be adopted for the study as indicated by Watheka (2015).

The research instruments used in the study was a close-ended questionnaire. The questionnaires for the returnees had both open-ended and closed-ended questions. The interview schedule was administered to key informants. Pilot study used 10% (10) of the sample size from Isiolo County. Data analysis involves reducing accumulated data to a manageable size, developing summaries, looking for patterns, and applying statistical techniques (Watheka, 2015). To establish the main characteristics of the study variables, descriptive statistics were employed to reduce, summarize data and describe items and constructs. The distribution shape of the variables using skewness and kurtosis was also undertaken to find the deviation from normality. Then data was summarized using frequency distributions and percentages (Hair et al., 2011).

RESULTS

Response Rate

Although the study intended to collect data from 100 respondents, data was collected from 92 respondents. This represents a response rate of 92% and falls within the confines of a large sample size ($n \geq 30$). This response rate deemed acceptable in accordance with recommendations that a response rate above 92% is excellent (Kothari, 2011). This provides a smaller margin of error and good precision (Churchill, 2013).

Profile of Respondents

The demographic profile of the survey included gender, age, marital status, employment, religion, sub-county, average earnings, and education level.

Gender of Respondents

When requested to indicate their gender, 100% (92) indicated that they were male (Table 1).

Age of the Respondents

Results indicated that 52.2% were in age bracket 18-25 years, 31.5% were between 26-30 years old, while 16.3 % were above between 31-35 years. This indicated that the majority of the respondents, more than half, were below in the age bracket 18-25. It was therefore deduced that radicalization due to marginalization affects youth in the age bracket 18-25. The results are summarized in Table 2.

Marital Status of the Respondents

Data obtained indicated that 7.6% of the respondents were single, 84.8% were married, while 7.6% were widowers. The results are presented in Table 3. The interpretation from the results is that marriage comes with more familial responsibility and yet the youth end up being victims of a feeling of despondency. This predisposes the married youth to feel marginalized and hence pose a security threat.

Employment Status of the Respondents

As per the employment status of the respondents, data indicated that 12% were in formal employment, 77.2% were unemployed, while 9.8% were engaged in non-formal employment activities. This indicated that there is widespread unemployment in the Madera triangle that underpins the security challenges experienced in area. The results are presented in Table 4.

Monthly Earnings of the Respondents

Results showed that 72.8% of the respondents earned less than Ksh 5000 per month, 14.1% earned between 5,000 and 10,000, 8.7% had earnings the range 10,001 and 20,000, while a paltry 4.3% had earnings above Ksh 20,000. This is an indication of lack of economic empowerment that spurs insecurity in the Mandera triangle, Kenya (Table 5).

Table 1. Gender of the respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative %
Valid	Male	92	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 2. Age of the respondents

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative %
18-25 years	48	52.2	52.2	52.2
26-30 Years	32	34.7	34.7	86.9
31-35 Years	12	13.1	16.3	100.0
Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 3. Marital status of the respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative %
Valid	Single	7	7.6	7.6	7.6
	Married	78	84.8	84.8	92.4
	Widowers	7	7.6	7.6	100.0
	Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Table 4. Employment status of the respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative %
Valid	Formal Employment	11	12.0	12.0	12.0
	Unemployed	72	78.2	78.2	90.2
	Self-Employment	9	9.8	9.8	100.0
	Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey data (2018)

Table 5. Monthly earnings of the respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	less than Ksh 5000	67	72.8	72.8	72.8
	5000-10,000	13	14.1	14.1	87.0
	10,001-20,000	8	8.7	8.7	95.7
	More than 20,000	4	4.3	4.3	100.0
	Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey data (2018)

Highest Education Level of the Respondents

Data on the highest education level attained by the respondents indicated that 7.6% had no formal education, 29.3% had KCPE certificate, 31.5% had KCSE, 13.0% had certificate level of education, and 13.0% were diploma holders. Only 4.05 had degree level of education with none having postgraduate education. The level of illiteracy among the respondents was high, most having attained primary

and secondary education. In North Eastern province, literacy level of only 37.7 per cent was recorded in 1999 (Ombati, 2015). The high level of illiteracy has the net effect of making the youth not to be engaged in meaningful economic activities and hence have the feeling of being marginalized. This leads to radicalization and insecurity in the Mandera Triangle. This is presented in Table 6.

Table 6. Highest education level

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative %
Valid	No formal education	7	7.6	7.6	7.6
	KCPE	27	29.3	29.3	37.0
	KCSE	29	31.5	31.5	68.5
	Certificate	12	13.0	13.0	81.5
	Diploma	12	13.0	13.0	94.6
	Degree	5	5.4	5.4	100.0
	Total	92	100.0	100.0	

Source: Survey data (2018)

Descriptive Statistics of the Study Variables

Descriptive statistics of means, standard errors, and standard deviation were obtained for the variable security and marginalization (Table 7).

Marginalization

Considering the variable of marginalization, the mean as a measure of central tendency was found to be in the

range 2.1522 to 2.9457 for the 10 items measuring the variable. The overall mean for the variable marginalization was found to be 2.5761. On a 5-point Likert scale, this meant that the score was average on the aspect of marginalization. The values of standard deviations for marginalization were in the range 1.09308 to 1.37529 and the overall standard deviation was .87233. The relatively high standard deviation

value indicates that the variability in the spread of the scores was high. For standard error of the mean the value was .09095 indicating that the mean values for the items were reliable. Inspection of the scores of each item measuring marginalization indicated that the respondents scored highest in the item ‘I have not been recognized as a stakeholder in development issues’

(M4) which posted a mean value of 2.9457 with a standard deviation of 1.09308. On the other hand, the item ‘I Feel angry, alienated or disenfranchised’ (M9) had the lowest mean of 2.1522 with standard deviation of 1.24860. The marginalization descriptive statistics are presented in Table 7.

Table 7. Descriptive statistics for marginalization

Code	Item	Mean		SD
		Stat	SE	
M1	I feel not engaged in the daily community activities	2.1957	.13931	1.33622
M2	I have not been involved in decision making	2.4891	.12698	1.21795
M3	I have not been empowered to participate in economic development	2.7935	.13344	1.27992
M4	I have not been recognized as a stakeholder in development issues	2.9457	.11396	1.09308
M5	I have felt a sense of hopelessness with my status quo	2.9130	.13881	1.33138
M6	I have no meaningful contribution to economic development	2.9022	.14338	1.37529
M7	I have no meaningful contribution social development	2.4457	.13682	1.31236
M8	I have been made to feel not important in the society	2.7283	.13572	1.30176
M9	I Feel angry, alienated or disenfranchised	2.1522	.13018	1.24860
M10	I Believe that the current political involvement does not give me the power to effect real change	2.1957	.13931	1.33622

Source: Survey data (2018)

Security

The descriptive statistics for the items of security indicated that the means were in the range 2.46741 to 2.7391. This gave an overall mean of 2.5823. On a 5-point Likert scale, the mean score were above average. The standard deviations were in the range 1.783 to 2.134. The overall standard deviation for security was 1.26385 and it infers that 99.9% of the responses were

spread within three standard deviation of the overall mean. The relatively high standard deviation value indicates that the variability in the spread of the scores was low. The standard errors of the mean for the items measuring security were low indicating that the mean values for the items were reliable. Security descriptive statistics are presented in Table 8.

Table 8. Descriptive statistics for security

	Item	Mean		SD
		Stat	SE	
SC1	Has had cases of religious violence	2.5543	.14611	1.40144
SC2	Has reported many cases of political violence	2.5000	.15417	1.47879
SC3	Has reported cases of violent extremism	2.5761	.15397	1.47681
SC4	Has had low levels of crime	2.7391	.15212	1.45911
SC5	Has been experiencing high levels of threat from extremists groups	2.6196	.13371	1.28253
SC6	Has had several incidences of radicalized groups attacks	2.6196	.14812	1.42074
SC7	Has been categorized as being prone to militant groups attacks	2.4674	.14454	1.38636

Source: Survey Data (2018)

Test of Regression Assumptions

Normality can be examined by using the values of skewness and kurtosis. While skewness has to do with symmetry, kurtosis indicates the extent to which the data is peak or flat (Tabacknich and Fidell, 2007). All the values of skewness and kurtosis fell in the approximate range -1.00 and +1.00 and it was concluded that the distribution of data for the variables was normal. The results are summarized in Table 8.

Correlation Analysis of Study Variables

Pearson correlation analysis was used to examine the relationship between the variables (Wadgy, 2007). The results are presented in Table 9. All the associated pairs of variables were significant at level 0.01 hence hypothesized relationships developed were found to be statistically significant at level $p < 0.01$. Security

challenges correlated with marginalization significantly and negatively ($r=-.701$, $p<.01$).

Regression Results

The study sought to investigate the effect of how determinants of youth radicalization affect security in the Mandera Triangle. The analysis involved investigating the effects of the independent variables (social media use, marginalization, education level, and

social cultural factors on security, the direct effects. The set hypothesis (H_0) stated that marginalization has no significant effect on security in Mandera Triangle. Regression results captured in Table 11 indicated that marginalization had a negative significant effect on security ($\beta = -.400$, $p<0.05$). This meant that marginalization enhances security challenges in the Mandera triangle, Kenya.

Table 9. Normality test results

	Mean	Skewness	Kurtosis		
	Statistic	Statistic	Std. Error	Statistic	Std. Error
Marginalization	2.5761	.584	.251	-.548	.498
Social Cultural Factors	2.3214	1.008	.251	-.476	.498
Security	2.5823	.770	.251	-1.002	.498

Source: Survey data (2018)

Table 10. Correlation coefficients

		1	
1	Security	1	
2	Marginalization	-.701**	1

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 11. Regression results

Model	Unstd Coeff		Std Coeff	T	Sig.
	B	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	-.586	.724		-.809	.421
Marginalization	-.400	-.150	-.276	2.664	.009

CONCLUSIONS

Most of the radicalized youth are male aged 30-35 years. The main religion is Islam. Some have returned from the radicalized groups and reformed. The youth are radicalized due to economic gains. External factors, such as tensions in the local community, events affecting their county or region of origin, having friends or family who have joined extremist groups, and exposure to narrow points of view and unemployment, necessitated the process of youth radicalization. Marginalization is has a significant negative effect on security in the Mandera Triangle. When people feel marginalized, they will be vulnerable to radicalization and pose a security threat to residents.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that the youth feel marginalized, it is incumbent upon the government to have measures in place so as to mainstream the youth into social, political and economic spheres of life. There is need to have a policy framework to address inequality in education in the Mandera triangle so as to increase affordability and accessibility. There is need to have deliberate policy measures to address the issue of marginalization in the

Mandera Triangle so as to improve security. Additionally, to prevent youth radicalization and insecurity in Mandera Triangle and based on the study's conclusions the following recommendations may be applied: The national and county government to increase the security situation by hiring local youth as security officers. Encouragement of youth groups' formation oriented to business establishment. Setting up youth funds, incentives and credit for businesses. Increase border patrol and security in the region by increasing the number of security personnel. Religious leaders to condemn youth radicalization through appropriate preaching and teachings in mosques.

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